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The goal of this study was to examine age effects on the ability/willingness to wait for
large rewards in a real temporal reward discounting task from childhood to adulthood.
Therefore, a real temporal discounting (TD) task was administered to children aged 6–12
(n = 39), adolescents aged 13–17 (n = 28), and young adults aged 18–19 (n = 55). Findings
indicated that the cross-sectional development of TD followed a quadratic pattern across
age groups, with adolescents choosing more often than children and adults to wait for
the large delayed reward, resulting in reward-maximization. Various interpretations of this
finding were offered, including a focus on reward maximization despite an immature ability
to exert self-control, and flexible self-control which was high during this task as a result of
strong motivation to maximize financial gains.
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INTRODUCTION
Trading the anticipated benefits and costs of two choice options
at different points in time is an important skill that we need to
navigate through life: balancing the pursuit of future goals with
enjoyment of the present moment, choosing between a high-fat
dinner which you may enjoy and a perhaps less-preferred but
healthier salad, deciding whether to save money for retirement
or spending most of it now. When this balancing of short-term
smaller gains and long-term larger gains is measured in laboratory
settings, this is typically done by the use of temporal reward dis-
counting tasks. Temporal discounting (TD) may be defined as the
decrease of the subjective value of a (often monetary) reward as
a function of pre-reward delay durations (Rachlin, 1989; Ainslie,
1992; Green and Myerson, 1993; Critchfield and Kollins, 2001).
Put simply, the subjective value of a reward typically decreases
the longer one has to wait for it. The rate at which this dis-
counting takes place is measured by observing preferences when
presented with choices between small immediate rewards and
larger delayed rewards. In these choices, the large reward is usu-
ally kept constant (for example $100), while the small reward
varies (e.g., $10/20/30/40/50/60/70/80/90). The delays preceding
the large reward are also varied (e.g., 1/30/90/180/365 days). For
each delay, the large reward is paired with each of the small
rewards and presented as a choice. For example, one choice may
be “would you rather receive $50 today or $100 after 30 days?” By
observing for each delay how large the immediate reward needs
to be for a participant to be indifferent between the two options,
one can then plot a discounting function indicating how rapidly
the subjective value of a large reward decreases as a function of
waiting time (see Critchfield and Kollins, 2001; Scheres et al.,
2013). Generally, strong preferences for small immediate rewards
result in steep TD functions (small area under the curve), while
strong preferences for large delayed rewards result in shallow TD
functions (large area under the curve).
The ability/willingness to forego smaller immediate rewards
in favor of larger delayed rewards varies across individuals
and is especially weak in those with psychiatric conditions
with a childhood or adolescence onset, such as Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and Substance Abuse (Sonuga-
Barke et al., 2008; de Wit, 2009; Luman et al., 2010). Additionally,
the seminal work by Mischel et al. (2011 for a review), which uti-
lizes the classic delay of gratification paradigm, has shown that the
ability/willingness to wait at a young age predicts success in the
academic, social, cognitive, and emotional domains during ado-
lescence and adulthood. However, while the ability/willingness to
wait has been shown to increase from young adulthood to old age
(e.g., Green et al., 1994; Jimura et al., 2011; see also Green et al.,
1996), our knowledge about how this develops from childhood
into adulthood is still limited. This is because studies are relatively
few (Scheres et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2007; Steinberg et al., 2009;
Prencipe et al., 2011; Demurie, 2012; de Water et al., 2014), task
formats vary across studies (hypothetical, potentially real, and
real), and the majority of studies only included a relatively small
age range (Scheres et al., 2006; Prencipe et al., 2011; Demurie,
2012; de Water et al., 2014), therefore not giving insight into
the development from childhood into adulthood. One important
reason to understand this developmental pathway in healthy pop-
ulations is that it will provide a reference with which to compare
individuals with childhood/adolescence-onset clinical conditions,
such as ADHD and substance abuse.
Thus far, studies examining age effects on TD have pri-
marily relied on tasks in which waiting times do not need to
be endured and rewards are not actually paid to participants.
Administering such a hypothetical taskwith large rewards of $1000
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and delays ranging from 1 day to 1 year to 935 adolescents
and adults, Steinberg et al. (2009) reported that individuals
aged 13 and younger discounted delayed rewards significantly
more steeply than individuals aged 16 and older, with the 14–15
years olds falling in between. Similarly, Christakou et al. (2011)
reported a linear increase from adolescence to adulthood in abil-
ity/willingness to wait for the large reward in a hypothetical TD
paradigm with $100 as the large reward and delays between 1
week and 1 year. Finally, Demurie (2012) used a hypothetical TD
task with smaller money amounts and shorter waiting times: the
large reward was 30 euro, and waiting times varied between 1 day
and 2 weeks. They observed an increase in ability/willingness to
wait for 30 euro from 8–10 to 11–13 years old, but the 14–16 years
olds fell somewhere in between the 8–10 and 11–13 years olds.
This suggests an inverted U-shaped relation between age and abil-
ity/willingness to wait, with maximal ability/willingness to wait in
11–13 years olds.
Four studies examining age effects on TD made use of poten-
tially real tasks. In these tasks, participants are informed that
one choice will be randomly selected and paid to the participant
(Olson et al., 2007; Prencipe et al., 2011; de Water et al., 2014), or
that there is a one in six chance that one choice will be randomly
selected and paid to the participants (Audrain-McGovern et al.,
2009). This design relies on the assumption that participants will
choose on each trial pair as if it will have real consequences. In
three of these studies, the large reward was $10 and delays pre-
ceding this reward ranged from 1 day to 1 year. A linear increase
in ability/willingness to wait from 8–9 years of age to 14–15 years
of age was observed (Prencipe et al., 2011), and from adolescence
to adulthood (Olson et al., 2007; de Water et al., 2014). In the
third study that used a potentially real task (Audrain-McGovern
et al., 2009), the large reward varied between $25 and 85. The
delays preceding this reward varied between 1 week and 6months.
Additionally, this study was unique in that it used a longitudi-
nal (as opposed to cross-sectional) design, following participants
from age 15 to 20, with data collected once every year. TD was
found to be stable.
Finally, only in one study by Scheres et al. (2006), a real, expe-
riential task was used, with large rewards of 10 dollar cents and
actual waiting times between 5 and 30 s. Delays were endured
by participants and money amounts were really paid to partici-
pants. With this task, Scheres et al. reported that 6–11 years olds
discounted delayed rewards more strongly than 12–17 years old,
suggesting a linear increase in the ability/willingness to wait from
childhood into adolescence.
Taking these studies together, we can conclude that there is a
clear need for studies with more ecologically valid tasks in which
a wider age range is included in order to enable researchers to
examine whether decreases in discounting from childhood to
young adolescence persist into older adolescence and emerging
adulthood, or whether non-linear patterns may be observed from
childhood into young adulthood. When summarizing the results
from current studies, we can conclude that findings aremixed: age
effects were reported to be linear, non-linear, and non-existent.
Explanations for these inconsistencies may be found in the fact
that most researchers may only have examined linear effects and
not non-linear effects as well, in the different age ranges used,
and in potentially meaningful differences in the specific TD task
parameters such as magnitude of the rewards, duration of the
delays, and whether the task was hypothetical, potentially real,
or real. Most studies relied on hypothetical or potentially real
tasks, limiting the ecological validity. The age range in most stud-
ies was restricted: only children and adolescents were included,
or adolescents and adults, while only two studies enrolled chil-
dren, adolescents, as well as adults (Olson et al., 2007; Steinberg
et al., 2009). These latter two studies were limited in terms of eco-
logical validity because they did not use real tasks. Previous work
has shown that changes in task parameters and format have sig-
nificant effects on the degree of discounting (Robles and Vargas,
2007, 2008; Tesch and Sanfey, 2008; Robles et al., 2009; Rodzon
et al., 2011). Therefore, it is likely that differences in results are
partly related to task differences.
More specifically, one may hypothesize that the findings
depend on the relative contribution of self-control vs. affective
processes to the choices made during the specific task. Although
traditionally, the ability/willingness to wait for a large reward has
been viewed as a sign of self-control, and a relative preference for
small immediate rewards is often considered an index of impul-
sivity (e.g., Critchfield and Kollins, 2001; Green and Myerson,
2004), we suggest that TD may be better viewed as reflecting a
trade-off between the ability to wait (self-control), and affective
processes such as the sensitivity to the immediacy of the small
reward and sensitivity to the magnitude of the delayed reward.
Concretely, in order to wait for the larger delayed reward, an indi-
vidual must be both willing and able to endure the waiting time,
and be sufficiently motivated by/interested in the large reward
as compared to the smaller, immediate alternative, to make the
waiting worthwhile (see Marco et al., 2009; Kable, 2010; Scheres
et al., 2010a for related discussions). Importantly, the relative con-
tribution of self-control functions and affective processes in TD
tasks may vary depending on the specific task parameters cho-
sen. For example, in hypothetical tasks and/or in tasks with long
delay durations, affective processes may play a minor role while
cognitive control function may play a primary role. Therefore,
the linear age effects which were mostly reported in studies with
hypothetical tasks and long delay durations might be due to
improvements in cognitive control functions during adolescence
(Ridderinkhof and van der Molen, 1997; Williams et al., 1999;
Luna et al., 2004; van den Wildenberg and van der Molen, 2004;
Luciana et al., 2005; Huizinga et al., 2006; Bunge and Wright,
2007; Crone, 2009;Mischel et al., 2011).Whether studies with real
tasks and/or short delay durations, which may rely more heavily
on affective processes, will find linear or non-linear age effects
in a sample spanning childhood to adulthood is an empirical
question.
Therefore, the current study had three primary aims. First, we
focused on a relatively wide age range, examining age effects on
TD by including children, adolescents, as well as emerging adults.
To this end, we included data from participants in these three
age groups that were previously collected as part of larger studies
(Scheres et al., 2006, 2008, 2010a,b). All participants were admin-
istered the same task. Secondly, we chose to use a real task in which
participants experienced the consequences of their choices during
the experiment: They endured the waiting times and received the
rewards (money amounts displayed on the screen, and the actual
sum of money paid at the end of the experiment). This is a clear
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advantage in terms of ecological validity, especially for the age
range used here (see Navarick, 2004; Reynolds and Schiffbauer,
2004; Lagorio and Madden, 2005; Scheres et al., 2010b). While in
real tasks, the reward magnitudes are necessarily small (typically
up to $1) and delay durations relatively short (up to 60 s), these
tasks have been proven to be useful in examining individual dif-
ferences in children and adolescents. Additionally, the task is also
a sensitivemeasure of discounting in young adults, as ceiling/floor
effects have not been shown (Scheres et al., 2010b). The third aim
of this study was to examine both linear and non-linear age effects
on discounting.
Due to inconsistent findings in prior research, and based
on different theoretical frameworks, several opposing hypothe-
ses could be formulated. Discounting might be hypothesized to
decrease linearly with age from childhood to adolescence and
emerging adulthood, based on previous findings (Scheres et al.,
2006; Olson et al., 2007; Steinberg et al., 2009), and based on
the assumption that TD tasks primarily tap into cognitive con-
trol abilities which follow a protracted developmental pattern
(Ridderinkhof and van der Molen, 1997; Williams et al., 1999;
Luna et al., 2004; van den Wildenberg and van der Molen, 2004;
Luciana et al., 2005; Huizinga et al., 2006; Bunge and Wright,
2007; Crone, 2009; Mischel et al., 2011). In contrast, non-linear
age-related changes in TD, with a peak ability/willingness to
wait during adolescence could be predicted based on one previ-
ous study (Demurie, 2012), and based on the notion that tasks
with short delays and real rewards may trigger a relatively heavy
involvement of affective processes, which play a unique role dur-
ing adolescence (Ernst et al., 2005, 2006; Steinberg, 2005, 2008,
2010; Galvan et al., 2006; Casey et al., 2008a,b; Somerville et al.,
2010; van Leijenhorst et al., 2010a,b; Crone and Dahl, 2012). A
third possibility is that discounting remains stable, although pre-
vious work reporting on the lack of age effects was limited to
15–20 years olds (Audrain-McGovern et al., 2009). In order to
address these competing hypotheses, we tested both linear and
non-linear (i.e., quadratic) age effects in this study.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Three groups participated: children, adolescents, and young
adults. The child group consisted of 39 typically developing 6–
12 year olds (25 male, 14 female; mean age 9.3, SD = 1.9), and
the adolescent group consisted of 28 typically developing 13–17
year olds (17 male, 11 female; mean age 14.4, SD = 1.2). Both
of these groups participated in previous research in which they
were compared to children and adolescents with ADHD (Scheres
et al., 2006, 2010a). The young adult group consisted of 55 under-
graduate psychology students (26 male, 29 female; mean age 18.2,
SD = 0.4) (see Scheres et al., 2008, 2010b).
TASK
Participants played a TD task in which they were instructed to
make repeated choices between a small variable reward (2, 4, 6,
or 8 cents) that would be delivered after 0 s and a large constant
reward (10 cents) that would be delivered after a variable delay
[5, 10, 20, 30, (or 60) s]. For example, on some trials, partici-
pants had to choose between 6 cents now or 10 cents after waiting
20 s. Trials were administered in the same pseudo-random order
to all participants. Each small immediate reward was paired twice
with every delay for the large reward, resulting in a total of 40
choice trials. Choices were visually represented by two airplanes
on a computer screen; each airplane carried their corresponding
quantity of money, which was represented by a number and that
specific amount of coins. Delays were represented by the level
that the airplanes were flying—the higher the plane, the longer
the delay duration (see Figure 1). The left or right position of
the delayed reward plane was balanced over trials. Participants
made a choice by pressing the button corresponding to the pre-
ferred plane (right or left) which resulted in the plane “dropping”
its money into the participant’s money basket on the bottom of
the computer screen, either immediately or after the appropriate
delay. Before the next trial the computer visually updated the total
number of cents won. Participants were informed of the number
of trials they would be presented with. Importantly, participants
were not informed about the durations of the delays. Instead, they
endured each delay during task practice, giving them a sense of
the delay duration associated with each airplane level, without
revealing the actual duration. After task completion, participants
received the total amount of money won.
PROCEDURE
The study was approved by the Human Subjects Protection
Program of the University of Arizona and New York University
School of Medicine, and all participants provided prior written
informed assent and consent.
DATA PREPROCESSING
Data were preprocessed based on previously reported procedures
(Myerson et al., 2001; Scheres et al., 2006). Two independent
raters determined subjective values for the delayed reward for
each delay. Subjective value was defined as the magnitude of
the small immediate reward for which the participant showed
indifference in a choice against the large delayed reward (see
Critchfield and Kollins, 2001; Scheres et al., 2006). Between-rater
agreement was very good (mean kappa 0.90, range 0.72–1.00). In
rare cases of disagreement, a consensus on subjective value was
reached by discussion. The second step was to calculate area under
FIGURE 1 | Example of a temporal reward discounting choice trial. This
choice is between 6 cents immediately and 10 cents after 30 s.
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 711 | 3
Scheres et al. Age effects on temporal discounting
the discounting curve (AUC) for the TD functions (following the
procedure described by Myerson et al., 2001, and used by Scheres
et al., 2006, 2010a,b). First, subjective values and delays were nor-
malized. That is, subjective values were expressed as proportions
of the amount of the maximum delayed reward, and delays were
expressed as proportions of themaximumdelay. In this case, since
the delays ranged from 5–30 in one dataset (Scheres et al., 2006)
and from 5–60 in the other datasets (Scheres et al., 2010a,b), 30 s
was used as the maximum delay for the purpose of delay stan-
dardization (see Myerson et al., 2001). The normalized values
were used as x and y coordinates (x = delay; y = subjective value).
The data points on the y axis were connected, thus forming the
discounting function. From each standardized subjective value,
vertical lines were drawn to determine separate trapezoids. The
area of each trapezoid equals (x2 − x1) ∗ [(y1 + y2)/2], where x1
and x2 are successive delays, and y1 and y2 are the subjective val-
ues associated with these delays. Using this formula, the area of
each trapezoid was calculated and subsequently the areas were
summed, resulting in the dependent variable of interest: total
AUC which has a range of 0–1. In general, a smaller AUC reflects
a steeper discounting function (i.e., less willingness to wait as the
delay duration increases).
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Age group comparisons
ANOVAs were conducted with AUC as the dependent variable
and age group with three levels (children, adolescents, emerg-
ing adults) as the between subject factor. Significant main effects
of group in the ANOVA were followed by contrast analyses to
examine the shape of the age effect.
Regression analyses
Because the group stratification by age may be viewed as arbi-
trary, we also used linear regression to examine the continuous
relation between age and AUC. In order to examine linear effects,
age was entered as the predictor and AUC as the dependent vari-
able. In order to test for non-linear (quadratic) age effects, age ×
age (after centering age around its mean) was entered as a pre-
dictor, with AUC as the dependent variable. Finally, in order to
test whether there was a meaningful difference in the explanatory
power of linear vs. quadratic effects, age was entered as a predictor
at step 1, followed by age × age at step 2.
RESULTS
ANOVA showed that there was a significant, medium-sized effect
of age group on AUC when comparing children, adolescents, and
adults [F(2, 121) = 7.4, p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.11]. Subsequent
contrast analysis revealed that the shape of this age effect was
best described as quadratic (p < 0.001, as compared to p < 0.08
for linear), with an increase in AUC from childhood (M = 0.49,
SE = 0.03) to adolescence (M = 0.67, SE = 0.04), followed by a
decrease in AUC from adolescence to emerging adulthood (M =
0.56, SE = 0.03). Figure 2 displays the discounting curves for
each age group.
Regression analysis showed that there was a small-sized linear
increase of AUC with increasing age that fell short of statistical
significance (r = 0.17; p < 0.058, R2 = 0.03). The quadratic
relation between age and AUC, however, was significant and
medium-sized (r = −0.32; p < 0.001, R2 = 0.10). The abil-
ity/willingness to wait appeared to peak around age 14 (see
Figure 3). The quadratic effect added explanatory power over and
beyond the linear effect (R2 = 0.08; p < 0.002).
DISCUSSION
This study had as a goal to examine whether age effects on tempo-
ral reward discounting (TD) with a real task with relatively small
money amounts and short waiting times were linear or quadratic
in a group of participants spanning childhood to emerging adult-
hood (6–19). To this end, we analyzed data from a real TD task
that was administered to children, adolescents, and young adults
(Scheres et al., 2006, 2008, 2010a,b). We tested both linear and
quadratic effects of age on AUC. The findings did not support
the hypothesis of a linear relation between age and TD, but did
FIGURE 2 | Temporal reward discounting functions for children,
adolescents, and young adults.
FIGURE 3 | The relation between age and ability/willingness to wait,
as measured by Area Under the discounting Curve (AUC)
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support the hypothesis that of a quadratic relation between age
and TD, with the ability/willingness to wait for large rewards
peaking during adolescence, in particular at the age of 14.
At first, this may seem a counter-intuitive finding because
adolescents are often thought of as impulsive, while choosing
to maximize rewards relatively often as they did on this task is
typically viewed as the opposite of impulsive, namely as a sign
of self-control (e.g., Critchfield and Kollins, 2001; Green and
Myerson, 2004; Mischel et al., 2011). For instance, Mischel et al.
(2011) have proposed that the ability to resist temptation in favor
of long-term goals, also referred to as “willpower,” self-control, or
a variety of inhibitory processes, is the key ingredient which deter-
mines to what extent a participant is able to overcome a tempting
immediate reward (see also Figner et al., 2010). However, we
note here that inhibitory control has been shown to develop lin-
early from childhood into adulthood (Ridderinkhof and van der
Molen, 1997;Williams et al., 1999; Crone, 2009). On the contrary,
our data show a non-linear developmental pattern for TD. Thus,
we suggest here that multiple processes are important determi-
nants of choice preference in TD tasks, with inhibition being only
one of them. The following factors also play an important role:
sensitivity to reward immediacy, sensitivity to reward magnitude,
and delay aversion (see Marco et al., 2009; Scheres et al., 2010a).
Therefore, based on the idea that it is useful to think of self-
control and various reward aspects as playing complementary
and interactive roles in TD paradigms, we propose the follow-
ing interpretation of the data: Choices made on TD paradigms
likely result from a balance between affective processes includ-
ing delay aversion and sensitivity to various reward aspects (such
as immediacy of the reward, and magnitude of the reward) on
the one hand, and self-control on the other. This balance may
be biased toward affective, reward-related aspects or toward self-
control, depending on factors such as age and context (e.g., is the
task real or hypothetical). Our data show that the balance gravi-
tated toward “self-control” in adolescence, as compared to child-
hood and adulthood. However, this does not necessarily mean
that self-control peaks in adolescence: On the contrary, there
is ample evidence to suggest that self-control keeps improving
well into adulthood (Williams et al., 1999; Crone, 2009). Rather,
the current findings may suggest that a relatively high sensi-
tivity to reward magnitude/maximization motivated adolescents
to wait, despite their generally immature ability to exert self-
control. This interpretation is consistent with previous research
which has demonstrated that reward-seeking or reward sensitiv-
ity peaks during early to middle adolescence (Galvan et al., 2006;
Steinberg, 2008, 2010; Casey et al., 2008a,b), and that reward- and
emotion- related brain regions (for example, the nucleus accum-
bens) are relatively mature during adolescence (e.g., Casey et al.,
2008a,b; Steinberg, 2008; see also Ernst et al., 2005, 2006; Galvan
et al., 2006; Galvan, 2010; Steinberg, 2010; van Leijenhorst et al.,
2010a,b). More generally, it is consistent with the idea that early
to middle adolescence is a unique developmental period.
Alternatively, it may be suggested that rather than the ability
to exert self-control being statically immature during adolescence,
this ability may flexibly fluctuate, depending on contextual, social,
and emotional factors. In this case, it may be hypothesized that
adolescents exerted great self-control because they were highly
motivated to maximize their financial gains (see Crone and Dahl,
2012 for a recent theoretical framework). In a different context,
such as in a hypothetical task in which the money would not
be paid to the participants, the motivation to exert self-control
may be lower, and a different developmental pattern for TD may
be found. This may be a plausible explanation for the fact that
most studies with hypothetical or potentially real TD tasks have
reported linear effects of age on the ability/willingness to wait
(Olson et al., 2007; Steinberg et al., 2009; Christakou et al., 2011;
Prencipe et al., 2011; de Water et al., 2014).
More generally, we cannot assume that hypothetical and real
TD tasks measure similar processes. Specifically, Navarick (2004)
has suggested that hypothetical TD tasks may measure an entirely
different discounting process than tasks using real rewards and
real delays. However, note that experimental research has later
demonstrated that previously found differences in discount rate
between real and hypothetical tasks are attributable to differ-
ences in reward magnitudes and delay durations (Lagorio and
Madden, 2005; Scheres et al., 2010b). It will be of interest to
directly compare the developmental pattern of real and hypo-
thetical discounting tasks with varying reward magnitudes and
delay durations in future research. Additionally, adding tasks that
measure self-control functions such as response inhibition and
working memory, as well as tasks that tap into affective aspects
such as reward valuation, will provide further insights.
A number of limitations need to be considered here. The
possible interpretations of the quadratic age effect are still spec-
ulative, and future research is clearly needed to replicate and
clarify these findings, including functional brain imaging work
to determine whether these age effects can be in part explained
by neuromaturational effects. Secondly, this study was aimed at
exploring the developmental pattern of TD from childhood into
young adulthood but did not include additional measures. We
recommend that future research includes a behavioral measure
of money valuation, to test whether the decrease in discount rate
from adolescence to adulthood can be explained by differences
in money valuation. Additionally, future research may implement
task manipulations to specifically examine the relative contribu-
tion of the various reward aspects in this task such as sensitivity
to reward immediacy, reward magnitude, and delay aversion (see
Scheres et al., 2010b). More specifically, such research could
include multiple versions of a TD task, such as with and with-
out post-reward delays (see Sonuga-Barke et al., 1992; Scheres
et al., 2006; Marco et al., 2009), and with varying reward mag-
nitudes and number of trials (Scheres et al., 2010a) in order to
achieve this goal. Finally, our goal is to follow this study by a larger
lifespan development study on TD, which will provide us with a
reference with which to compare the TD development of clinical
populations, such as ADHD (see Paus et al., 2008).
In conclusion, this study showed that the cross-sectional devel-
opment of TD from childhood into young adulthood asmeasured
with a real task, follows a quadratic pattern. More specifically, the
ability/willingness to wait peaked at age 14. Various interpreta-
tions of this finding were offered, including a focus on reward
maximization despite an immature ability to exert self-control,
and a high level of self-control which was motivated by the
prospect of a maximum money amount. These data may provide
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a reference with which to compare the development of TD in clin-
ical populations. Additional task manipulations as well as the use
of functional brain imaging will help to further clarify the nature
and biological basis of this finding.
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